Research on the Optimization of Labor Contracts in the Food Delivery Industry

Abstract

With the rapid growth of China’s platform economy, the food delivery industry has already become an integral employment area. However, the lack of standardized labor contracts brings widespread risks to riders, such as work-related injury disputes and unfair penalties. This research mainly focuses on optimizing labor contracts in the food delivery industry by using principal-agent theory as the core theoretical framework. By integrating official data from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS), platform operational reports, and typical dispute cases, it analyzes the information asymmetry between platforms and riders. For example, 60% of rider violations are “hidden actions” that cannot be observed and identifies three main conflicts under the “efficiency-first” algorithm: labor health risks (riders have an average daily working hour of 11.2 hours), reward-penalty imbalance (40% of penalties are caused by non-rider factors), and labor rights gaps (only 32% of riders have formal contracts). The findings provide a theoretical and empirical foundation for subsequent labor contract optimization strategies, which offers guidance for solving rider protection problems and promoting the sustainable development of the food delivery industry.