A Study on the Motivations and Governance Strategies for "Greenwashing" Behaviors of Chinese Enterprises in the Context of ESG Disclosure
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.61173/de98kq34Keywords:
ESG Disclosure, Corporate Greenwashing, Motivational Analysis, Governance StrategiesAbstract
Against the backdrop of the "dual carbon" strategy, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information disclosure has become a focal point for capital markets. However, some companies engage in misleading disclosure practices to "greenwash" their environmental performance, undermining market fairness and green transition objectives. This study, based on literature analysis and case studies, systematically examines the internal and external drivers of "greenwashing" behavior among Chinese firms, identifying key factors such as management incentives, organizational culture, governance deficiencies, investor preferences, regulatory arbitrage, and industry imitation. It proposes targeted governance strategies at the national, societal, and firm levels. The study finds that greenwashing is a rational choice driven by multiple intertwined factors, and governance must achieve synergy among institutional constraints, public oversight, and internal mechanisms. This research enriches the theoretical framework for studying corporate green behavior and provides practical reference value for improving ESG regulatory policies and enhancing the quality of corporate information disclosure.
References
[1] E.P. Yu, B.V. Luu, C.H. Chen, Greenwashing in environmental, social and governance disclosures, Res. Int. Bus. Financ. 52 (2020) 101192.
[2] J. Garst, K. Maas, J. Suijs, Materiality assessment is an art, not a science: selecting ESG topics for sustainability reports, Calif. Manage. Rev. 65 (1) (2022) 64-90.
[3] H.L. Friedman, M.S. Heinle, I. Luneva, ESG disclosure and greenwashing: evidence from regulatory pressure, SSRN Working Paper 3932689, (2021)
[4] China Listed Companies ESG Information Disclosure Analysis and Outlook Report – A-Shares, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing Stock Exchanges, 2024. Available at: https://www. sse.com.cn
[5] T.P. Lyon, J.W. Maxwell, Greenwash: corporate environmental disclosure under threat of audit, J. Econ. Manage. Strategy 20 (1) (2011) 3-41.
[6] L.K. Wedari, et al., Corporate climate-related voluntary disclosures: does potential greenwash exist among Australian high emitters’ reports? Bus. Strategy Environ. 30 (8) (2021) 3583-3599.
[7] C. Blome, et al., Antecedents of green supplier championing and greenwashing: an empirical study on leadership and ethical incentives, J. Clean. Prod. 152 (2017) 339-350.
[8] E. Poiriazi, G. Zournatzidou, G. Konteos, Do board characteristics matter with greenwashing? An investigation in the financial sector with the integration of entropy weight and TOPSIS multicriteria decision-making methods, Risks 13 (4) (2025) 64.
[9] Y. Li, et al., The motivation of corporate greenwashing: evidence from energy consumption intensity, Sustainable Dev. (2025), advance online publication.
[10] W. Li, et al., Effects of greenwashing on financial performance: moderation through local environmental regulation and media coverage, Bus. Strategy Environ. 32 (1) (2023) 820- 841.
[11] M. Verma, U. Bharti, Combating greenwashing tactics and embracing the economic success of sustainability, Veethika: Int. Interdiscip. Res. J. 9 (3) (2023) 6-12.
[12] L. Gatti, P. Seele, L. Rademacher, Grey zone in, greenwash out: a review of greenwashing research and implications for the voluntary–mandatory transition of CSR, Int. J. Corp. Soc. Responsib. 4 (1) (2019) 6.
[13] D. Zhao, et al., Peer effects on ESG disclosure: drivers and implications for sustainable corporate governance, Sustainability 17 (10) (2025) 4392.
[14] H. Gao, X. Ai, Supervision or collusion: the impact of heterogeneous industrial agglomeration on corporate greenwashing, Sustainability 17 (12) (2025) 5608.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 by the authors.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
