Investigating the factors affecting cooperating: a collaborative view of game theory
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.61173/rxqecx74Keywords:
Lab Experiments, Nash Equilibrium, Col-laboration, RelationshipAbstract
Human relationships are very essential in the real world since humans interact with each other every day. However, the study of human relationships in the field of behavioral economics lacks a game theory approach. This paper presents an insider’s view of how the closeness of people’s relationships to their investment partners would influence their willingness to collaborate in an investor’s game we self-designed. The results show that people who know their partner collaborate more than people who are close to or don’t know their partner because they are not worried about future interactions. Further implications of this finding could involve seeking out individuals who are familiar with each other to avoid reaching Nash equilibrium and achieve the optimal outcome.
References
Aart de Zeeuw. (2024). A Crash Course in Differential Games and Applications. Environmental and Resource Economics. Springer Science+Business Media.
Axelrod, R. (1980). Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 3–25.
Bacharach, M. (1989). Zero-sum Games. Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks. Bagwell, K., & Wolinsky, A. (2002, January 1). Chapter 49 Game theory and industrial organization. ScienceDirect. Elsevier. Retrieved July 25, 2024.
Brewer, M. B. (2007). The importance of being we: Human nature and intergroup relations. American Psychologist, 62(8), 728–738.
Cadsby, C. B., & Maynes, E. (2005). Gender, risk aversion, and the drawing power of equilibrium in an experimental corporate takeover game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 56(1), 39–59.
Carbone, J. (2023). Renegotiating the Gender Divide: Game Theory, Trust, and the Revitalization of Family Law. Ssrn.com. Dean&Francis Yifei Wang, Keyu Gu, Yuxi Hu Retrieved July 25, 2024.
Croson, R. T. A. (2000). Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 41(3), 299–314.
Croson, R., & Buchan, N. (1999). Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games. American Economic Review, 89(2), 386–391.
Embrey, M., Fréchette, G. R., & Yuksel, S. (2017). Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(1), 509–551.
Friedman, D. (1991). Evolutionary Games in Economics. Econometrica, 59(3), 637. Haesevoets, T., Reinders Folmer, C., Bostyn, D. H., & Van
Hiel, A. (2018). Behavioural Consistency within the Prisoner’S Dilemma Game: The Role of Personality and Situation. European Journal of Personality, 32(4), 405–426. Haesevoets, T., Van Hiel, A., Dierckx, K., & Reinders Folmer, C. (2020). Do multiple-trial games better reflect prosocial behavior than single-trial games? Judgment and Decision Making, 15(3), 330–345.
Hamburger, H. (1973). N‐person Prisoner’s Dilemma†. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 3(1), 27–48. Hayes, A. (2023, March 28). Game Theory Definition. Investopedia. Jiménez, S., Mercadillo, R. E., Angeles-Valdez, D., Sánchez- Sosa, J. J., Muñoz-Delgado, J., & Garza-Villarreal, E. A. (2022). Social closeness modulates brain dynamics during trust anticipation. Scientific Reports, 12(1), 16337.
Kalai, E., & Lehrer, E. (1993). Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium. Econometrica, 61(5), 1019. Kuhn, S. (2019, April 2). Prisoner’s Dilemma (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Stanford.edu.
Lo, K. C. (1999). Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality. Economic Theory, 14(3), 621–633. Mertens, J.-F. (1990, January 1). Repeated Games. (T. Ichiishi, A. Neyman, & Y. Tauman, Eds.)ScienceDirect. San Diego: Academic Press.
Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48–49.
Normann, H.-T., & Wallace, B. (2012). The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment. International Journal of Game Theory, 41(3), 707– 718.
Rapoport, A. (1974). Prisoner’s Dilemma — Recollections and Observations. Game Theory as a Theory of a Conflict Resolution, 17–34.
Rapoport, A. (1989). Prisoner’s Dilemma. Game Theory, 199– 204.
Saulo, H., Rêgo, L. C., & Divino, J. A. (2013). Fiscal and monetary policy interactions: a game theory approach. Annals of Operations Research, 206(1), 341–366.
Schwartz-Shea, P. (2002). Theorizing Gender for Experimental Game Theory: Experiments with “Sex Status” and “Merit Status” in an Asymmetric Game. Sex Roles, 47(7/8), 301–319.
Serena, M. (2017). A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games. Working Papers. Retrieved July 25, 2024.
Shapira, Z. (2002). Organizational Decision Making. Google Books. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved July 25, 2024.
Tintner, G., & Tiutner, G. (1957). Game Theory, Linear Programming and Input-Output Analysis. Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie / Journal of Economics, 17(1), 1–38. Retrieved July 25, 2024.
Verplanken, B. (2004). Value congruence and job satisfaction among nurses: a human relations perspective. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 41(6), 599–605.
Wilson, R. (1987). Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes. (T. F. Bewley, Ed.)Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved July 25, 2024.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 by the authors.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
