The positive impact of corporate mergers on consumer welfare: from the perspective of corporate R and D investment
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.61173/dtrkn178Keywords:
Firm merger, Consumer welfare, R&D expendituresAbstract
Enterprise mergers are essential for the development and growth of enterprises, and they are also an important mechanism for the market economy to improve the overall efficiency of the market through the survival of the fittest. Compared to gradually growing a company through internal accumulation, merging with other companies can achieve various goals such as scale expansion, business expansion, and financial optimization faster in a short period. Although business mergers are spontaneous actions of enterprises, the merger of enterprises, especially large enterprises, affects their performance and consumer welfare. To better study the potential impact of corporate mergers, this article combines traditional and modern merger theories to investigate the positive effects of corporate mergers on product prices, corporate innovation, and overall consumer welfare. The impact channels of Chinese-listed company mergers on their R&D expenses are evaluated empirically. Through empirical and theoretical analysis, this article proves that business mergers can improve efficiency, innovation, and consumer benefits by increasing research and development expenditures.
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